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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL COURTS-DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION-LIMITED
PARNERSHIPS- The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that in a limited partnership the citizenship of both
the general and limited partners shall be counted for federal diver-
sity jurisdiction, precluding such federal jurisdiction when complete
diversity is absent between all members of the limited partnership
and the opposing party.
Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings and Loan
Association, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
Carlsberg Resources Corporation (Carlsberg), a general partner'
in Carlsberg Mobile Home Properties, a limited partnership, insti-
tuted an action in the Federal District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania2 on behalf of the limited partnership.3 Carls-
berg alleged that the negligence of Cambria Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation (Cambria) in disbursing construction loans to the developers
of the trailer park purchased by Carlsberg caused the loss of the
property through a foreclosure sale. Carlsberg also contended that
the developers and other defendants' attempted to defraud the lim-
ited partnership by requesting loan advances with certificates inac-
curately indicating completed work.
1. The general partner is the proper party to the proceedings by or against a limited
partnership. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 26.
2. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). Carlsburg purchased a developing mobile home park
from one of the defendants, Forest Park, a general partnership, and then leased it back to
the partnership. At the time of the conveyance, the property was encumbered by a mortgage
held by Cambria Savings and Loan Association, which Carlsberg did not assume. The mort-
gage arose from a construction loan agreement between Cambria and the seller, which. stipu-
lated that funds were to be disbursed as improvements were made and certified. When Forest
Park, the seller/lessee, was unable to maintain its rental payments to Carlsberg, a foreclosure
sale occurred and Cambria purchased the property. Id. at 884-85.
3. "A limited partnership is a partnership formed by two or more persons ... having as
members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partners
as such shall not be bound by the obligation of the partnership." UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIP AcT § 1; CAL. CORP. CODE § 15501 (West 1977); 59 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 171 (Purdon
Supp. 1977-1978).
4. Carlsberg also sued, Forest Park, the general partnership, Anne Henderson, a bookkee-
per for Forest Park, Forest Enterprises, Inc., a corporation, and Deemer, the engineer in
charge of certifying the mobile home park's improvements before additional funds from the
construction loan were advanced.
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Carlsberg asserted federal diversity jurisdiction was present;5
Carlsberg, the only general partner of the limited partnership, was
a corporate citizen of California, and all the defendants were citi-
zens of Pennsylvania.' However, the district court judge questioned,
sua sponte, the claimed diversity, noting that in the averments
Carlsberg neither listed the citizenship of the limited partners nor
alleged that none were citizens of Pennsylvania.' Upon finding that
some of the limited partners were citizens of Pennsylvania,8 the
district court dismissed the case for lack of diversity? The court
concluded that the citizenship of a limited partnership, a type of
unincorporated association, must derive from all of its members
despite the statutory class distinctions between the general and
limited partners within the association itself.'" Both Carlsberg and
Cambria contested the dismissal, maintaining on appeal that a lim-
ited partnership is a unique statutory business organization and
that for purposes of diversity the citizenship of the general partners
was dispositive." Rejecting this rationale, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the holding of the district court."
The court of appeals'3 recognized the district court's duty to scru-
tinize its own subject matter jurisdiction in every case, sua sponte.'4
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (congressional grant of jurisdiction to district courts in diversity
cases).
6. 413 F. Supp. at 881.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 882. Thirty-eight of the more than 1500 limited partners were residents of Penn-
sylvania. Id. at 881, 884.
9. Id. at 881. The court, however, examined the merits of the case, and held in the
alternative that Carlsberg's negligence action was insufficient as a matter of law. The court
determined that it would have granted Cambria's motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed the case as to the remaining defendants for failure to state a claim. Id. at 884.
10. Id. at 881.
11. Counsel for Cambria did not answer the jurisdictional question in his brief but relied
on Carlsberg's position. Brief for Appellee at 4, Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). Since the district judge indicated that he would
have found for Cambria had he ruled on the merits, Cambria preferred to have jurisdiction
granted to obtain a favorable disposition of the case. 413 F. Supp. at 884-86. The judgment
could then have been used as a defense to pending litigation on the same issue in the state
court. See Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1255-56
n.3 (3d Cir. 1977).
12. 554 F.2d at 1262. The appellant does not plan to appeal this decision but will pursue
its claim in the state courts. A lawsuit had been initiated there containing the same allega-
tions present in the suit brought in federal court.
13. Judge Adams wrote the majority opinion in which Judge Biggs concurred. Id. at 1255.
Judge Hunter dissented. Id. at 1262.
14. Id. at 1256. The court illustrated this point by alluding to past cases involving unincor-
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In the court's view, the initial investigation into the jurisdictional
basis of a case is essential both to contain the volume of court
business and to preserve the constitutional and statutory structure
of federalism. 5 The court expressed concern that in spite of the
protection of state autonomy under the rule of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins," the federal courts were trespassers in disputes tradi-
tionally resolved by states under the common law. 7 Thus, it was
proper to frame diversity jurisdiction conservatively so as to grant
a federal forum sparingly. 8
The majority employed two tenets of diversity jurisdiction to sup-
port its decision: the courts' traditional denial of entity status to
unincorporated associations (resulting in the citizenship of all mem-
bers composing the organization being counted), coupled with the
historical mandate of absolute diversity for diversity jurisdiction."
The court examined a trilogy of cases, Chapman v. Barney ,2° Great
porated associations where the jurisdictional issue was raised independently by the appellate
court to deter collusion or accidental waiver of a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904) (individual members of the board of trustees of a
college were citizens for diversity purposes even though the board itself could sue or be sued);
Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.) (president and members of local union, as
plaintiffs, were held to be nondiverse from members of defendant international union and its
executive board, and thus diversity jurisdiction was precluded), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864
(1958).
15. 554 F.2d at 1256-57.
16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The basic controversy in Erie was which jurisdiction's duty of care
standards should apply in a diversity case: the forum state's or the federal court's. The result
was a determination that the federal courts were required to apply the substantive law of the
forum state in which they sat in diversity cases, and not an undefined federal common law.
17. The court referred to cases in the nature of a "conflict resolution," which it stated
constituted a "core public function of state government." 554 F.2d at 1257. The court cited
to Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 146 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring), in which a
repairman exercised his common law right to retain and sell vehicles which he possessed
because of unpaid bills. In Parks, Judge Adams reasoned that the power of the individual to
unilaterally resolve a conflict flowed from the state. 556 F.2d at 146. In Carlsberg, he seems
to have read this conflict resolution conclusion into diversity jurisdiction as a justification
for framing diversity narrowly.
18. 554 F.2d 1257. Admittance to the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship
"should be granted only where clearly appropriate and only to the extent, if at all, that is
justified." Id. at 1257.
19. Id. at 1258. The court cited to Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806),
which held that the legislative predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) mandated absolute
diversity. For a discussion of the implication of Strawbridge, see ALI STUDY OF THE DIvIsION
OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, Memorandum A (1969).
20. 129 U.S. 677 (1889). The Court in Chapman held that an express company could not
be a citizen of a state for diversity purposes unless it was a corporation. The court in Carlsberg
found Chapman analogous to the factual situation before it. In Chapman, even though the
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Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones," and United Steelworkers
v. R. H. Bouligny," all denying federal diversity jurisdiction to non-
corporate entities unless their entire membership was nondiverse
from the antipodal party. The Carlsberg majority postulated that
the more recent decision in Bouligny bolstered the pre-twentieth
century decisions in Chapman and Great Southern, maintaining
that any reconsideration of that status came within the purview of
Congress."3
In response to appellant's argument, the Carlsberg court then
shifted to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' divergent holding
in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache, 4 that a limited partner's citizen-
ship is not to be counted for diversity purposes in a cause of action
against the limited partnership itself. The court criticized the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals' reliance on the New York Limited
Partnership Act, which restricted the proper parties to an action by
or against a limited partnership to the general partner(s) alone.,,
The Carlsberg court rejected a jurisdictional analysis dependent
president of the express company had the right to sue for the entity, all members of the
express company were counted. Similarly, in Carlsberg, the general partner had the capacity
to sue for the entity. Thus, if the entire membership of the express company in Chapman
was to be counted, despite the president's status, it seemed logical that the entire member-
ship of the limited partnership in Carlsberg should be counted despite class distinctions
within the partnership. However, since the capacity issue does not appear to have been raised
in Chapman, the analogy lacks persuasiveness.
21. 177 U.S. 449, 457 (1900). Great Southern involved one class of members, all of whom
were limited partners of a limited partnership, a statutory arrangement approved by several
states in the earliest limited partnership acts. The Court held that federal diversity jurisdic-
tion required diversity of the entire membership; therefore, the citizenship of all individual
members had to be alleged, not simply that of the entity.
22. 382 U.S. 145 (1965). The Court unanimously held that for federal diversity jurisdiction
the citizenship of an unincorporated labor union is that of each of its members.
23. 554 F.2d at 1259.
24. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). In Colonial, a corporate
customer brought an action against a securities broker, a limited partnership. The issue was
whether federal civil liability could be implied under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for
a securities broker's breach of duty.
25. 554 F.2d at 1260-61. In Colonial, Judge Friendly, in adopting the viewpoint of the
district court judge as to the existence of diversity jurisdiction, briefly alluded to the utiliza-
tion of the state statute in the capacity inquiry:
[Wihere . . . diversity [existed] between the plaintiff and all the general partners
of the (limited partnership], identity of citizenship between the plaintiff and a lim-
ited partner was not fatal because under the applicable New York Statute a limited
partner "is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership. "N.Y.
Partnership Law § 115.
358 F.2d at 183-84.
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upon state statutes defining capacity."6 In its view, the jurisdictional
inquiry was primary, both in right and in time; the issue of capacity
was to be relegated to a secondary position." The court pointed out
that rule 17(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 which requires
federal courts to look to state law to determine capacity, is offset
by rule 82,25 which provides that the rules neither expand nor limit
the jurisdiction of the district courts. The court reasoned that any
inquiry into citizenship for diversity must be governed not by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the vagaries of state statutes,
but by the court itself, applying "principles of general applica-
tion." 0
Judge Hunter, dissenting, initially pointed out that the citizen-
ship of a limited partnership was a question of first impression
which had been addressed only cursorily in Colonial and which
deserved a thorough examination.' The dissent emphasized, how-
ever, that Judge Friendly's opinion was not an aberration but had
been cited with approval in one of his later decisions.32 Judge Hunter
disagreed sharply with the majority's unwillingness to resolve the
question of whose citizenship was to be counted in a limited partner-
ship terms of the parties who are given capacity to sue under the
26. 554 F.2d at 1261.
27. Id. at 1260.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). This section, in setting out the capacity to sue or be sued, directs
the federal court to look to the law of domicile when the individual brings the action in a
nonrepresentative status; if a corporation brings the action, the court should look to the law
under which it was organized, and for all other entities, to "the law under which it was
organized." The status of unincorporated associations has been held to be covered by this
latter residuary clause. 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.25 (2d ed. 1977).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 82. "Jurisdiction and Venue Unaffected. These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .... "
30. 554 F.2d at 1261. The court's reasoning appears to be based on the possible existence
of variegated state limited partnership statutes rather than on the existing uniform limited
partnership statute. If the capacity of the limited partners to sue or be sued involved a
multitude of diversified statutes where a party's status changed from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, then the court's worry would appear to be justified for not only might forum shopping
be the order of the day but states would in effect be determinators of the boundaries of federal
jurisdiction.
31. Id. at 1262.
32. Id. The dissent cited to Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971). The Woodward court, in determining the citizenship of a
traditional partnership, looked to the citizenship of all the individual partners rather than
to the partnership entity which had capacity to sue or be sued, distinguishing a partnership
from a limited partnership. The implication from the distinction is that in the latter entity,
the limited partners would not be counted because they are statutorily incapacitated from
asserting individual rights against third parties.
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Uniform Limited Partnership Act.3" Relying on several cases where
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had utilized rule 17(b) to define
its jurisdictional base, 34 Hunter reasoned that the capacity inquiry
should be used to indentify the parties whose citizenship was rele-
vant for diversity purposes.35 Recognizing that manufactured diver-
sity is possible in cases involving parties acting in a representative
role, Hunter noted that courts have traditionally retained the right
to examine the particular facts of a case, counting the real inter-
ested party instead of the nominal party in a manner consistent
with the relevant state law. 3 Hunter maintained that the inability
of a limited partner to assert an independent cause of action should
eliminate the citizenship of that party from consideration in diver-
sity cases. 7
The dissenter found the cases of Chapman and Great Southern,
relied on by the majority, clearly distinguishable from the facts of
33. 554 F.2d at 1262-63. Hunter pointed out that since all the states and the Virgin Islands
had adopted the act, a uniform disposition of this type of case was possible. (Louisiana has
not adopted the uniform statute because of its civil law system).
34. Id. at 1263 n.6. Hunter cited the following cases: McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867
(3d Cir. 1968) (rule 17(b) disregarded as dispositive basis for citizenship inquiry when the
diversity of the parties appeared to be manufactured), cert. denied sub nom. Fritzinger v.
Weist, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1957) (rule 17(b)
was used by the court to determine the entity status of an unincorporated labor union), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958); Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955) (rule 17(b) governed
the capacity of a guardian to sue for an incompetent and also the guardian's citizenship for
diversity jurisdiction, the court reasoning that rule 17 was "the most effective way to state
the diversity test").
35. 554 F.2d at 1263.
36. Id. at 1264, citing Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972) (Though relevant state
law required a resident administrator to be appointed which would have effectively destroyed
diversity jurisdiction, the court looked to the citizenship of the beneficiaries of the decedent
who were out-of-state residents. The court followed the directives of the state law while
counting only the actual parties in interest instead of the nominal parties, thus avoiding any
abuse of its jurisdiction.); and Bishop v. Hendricks, 456 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.) (administrator
deemed straw party since appointment was manifestly an artificial creation of federal diver-
sity. The court, utilizing 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) (congressional prohibition of manufactured
diversity), barred federal jurisdiction where the party had been improperly or collusively
joined to invoke jurisdiction), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
37. 554 F.2d at 1265. Because of the absence of relevant Pennsylvania cases, the dissent
cited to other state cases to illustrate this point. See Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App.
3d 118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1975) (limited partner assumed the liability of the partnership when
suing on behalf of a limited partnership); Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 25 App. Div.
2d 291, 268 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1965) (limited partners were barred from suing general partners in
the partnership name but were allowed to maintain a class action derivative suit against
general partners when fiduciary duty was breached), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876
(1966).
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Carlsberg.5 First, the modern statutory limited partnership could
not be equated with the single-classed limited partnership in Great
Southern,3" and second, the entity argument posited in Chapman
could not be compared to the capacity issue in Carlsberg.'° Bouligny
was also differentiated from Carlsberg; in the former, the court pos-
sessed no easy guidelines to determine the citizenship of a labor
union while in the latter there existed a uniform statute on which
to base the citizenship inquiry." Hunter also declared that the
availability of a federal forum to a multistate limited partnership
business organization was inherent in the original purpose of the
congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction," aimed at providing an
impartial forum to out-of-state litigants. Finally, Hunter equated
the status of general partners in a limited partnership with that of
traditional partners in a partnership, maintaining that the rights of
the former to a federal forum should be the same as the latter
currently possess.43
ORTHODOX CASE LAW VERSUS CAPACITY INQUIRY
The central issue confronting the court in Carlsberg revolved
around how to determine the citizenship of a limited partnership for
the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The majority's approach was
based on case law that precluded recognition of any noncorporate
association as a citizen for diversity purposes while the dissent
looked to the state laws that created the entity and applied the
capacity test flowing therefrom.4
38. 554 F.2d at 1264.
39. The partnership of Great Southern was one in which all the members had the same
status, unlike Carlsberg where there were two distinct classes of members. Id.
40. Hunter asserted that the entity argument was the main issue of Chapman and that
it was nowhere indicated that the capacity of the president to sue was considered by the court.
Id. at n.7.
41. Id. at 1264.
42. Id. at 1266 n.14. Since limited partnerships are by their nature multistate and multi-
party organizations, federal diversity jurisdiction would assure impartiality to out-of-state
litigants.
43. Id. at 1266.
44. The appellant's argument could have been used by the court as a way to reconcile
what became diametrically opposed positions on the bench. Counsel specifically rejected the
entity approach argument, which had been denied judicial acceptance. Instead, appellant
relied heavily on Judge Friendly's decision in Colonial, where limited partners were not
counted for diversity purposes, and a corollary rule posited in Great Southern: the "members




The case law analysis is fairly clearcut. Though Chapman and
Great Southern concerned dissimilar business organizations, both
clearly purported to exclude all business associations of the non-
corporate variety from citizenship status in diversity questions. If
the averments alleged the party to be a corporate citizen of a state,
the entity alone was the citizen for diversity purposes to the exclu-
sion of individual shareholders; if the averments alleged any other
kind of organization, all members were citizens for diversity pur-
poses.45 The noncitizenship status of unincorporated associations
remained settled until 1933 when the Supreme Court seemingly
carved out an exception in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co." Russell
held that the domicile of the civil law sociedad en comandita, an
unincorporated association, was the same as the party plaintiff and
destroyed diversity; thus, the case was remanded to the Insular
Court of Puerto Rico. In focusing on the issue of domicile, the Court
for the first time granted entity status to an unincorporated associa-
partnership by demonstrating a path consistent with both the case law and the capacity of
the parties. Appellant pointed to two district court cases in line with Colonial as support for
the argument: Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Housing Partnerships, 375 F. Supp.
446 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (where general partners sue limited partners, citizenship of the limited
partnership is determined by the citizenship of individual general partners); Erving v. Vir-
ginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, the citizenship of the general partners in a limited partnership is controlling).
Brief for Appellant at 16, 19-22, Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). Both cases, however, were poor vehicles to convince a court of
the viability of Colonial. The first case involved an intra-partnership controversy, not one in
which a third party was involved. The second case is an example of a district court following
the mandate of its circuit court of appeals, not necessarily an example of Colonial's popularity
at the district level. It seemed that appellant, instead of aiming its argument directly at the
capacity problem, distracted the court with its case law approach. As a result, the majority
allied itself with orthodox case law.
45. The averments in Chapman stated that petitioner was a joint stock company organ-
ized under the law of New York. The Court held that the company could not be a citizen
unless it was a corporation. 129 U.S. at 678. In Great Southern, the limited partnership
asserted it was a quasi-corporation, but the Court refused to consider such a status as suffi-
cient reason to treat the entity like a corporation. Utilizing the same reasoning it had used
in Chapman, the Great Southern Court held that since a limited partnership, by its own
admission, is not incorporated, all partners are to be counted for citizenship in diversity
jurisdiction. 177 U.S. at 457.
46. 288 U.S. 476 (1933). An unincorporated association peculiar to Puerto Rico, known
as a sociedad en comandita, was granted entity citizenship through the application of the
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, and the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, which formed the territorial
unit. 288 U.S. at 478-79. It is worthy of note that the characteristics of the sociedad, as
described in the case, appear strikingly similar to a modern limited partnership. Id. at 481.
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tion, rejecting the "members composing" test under which the req-
uisite diversity would have been attained.'7 In dicta, the Court dif-
ferentiated the sociedad from the unincorporated association on the
basis of corporate similarity; thus it appeared that the holdings of
Chapman and Great Southern were weakening where the business
entity had a corporate-type structure."5 Precedent breaking cases
appeared in the circuits. 9 In Bouligny, for example, the district
court granted citizenship status to a labor union and declined to
follow Chapman.0 However, in affirming the reversal of this deci-
sion by the court of appeals, and by refusing to expand the concept
of citizenship to a labor union, the Supreme Court reestablished the
holding of the older line of decisions and deferred any jurisdictional
change to Congress.5 Admittedly, the Bouligny Court was con-
cerned with the specifics of constructing a citizenship test for only
a labor union; however, in alluding to the Congressional assistance
eventually needed to cope with the simpler concept of corporate
citizenship, the Court revealed its disinclination to renovate the
47. 288 U.S. at 480-81. Judge Hunter cited to Russell, pointing out that, as a sociedad
was afforded entity treatment for citizenship purposes because it was an exotic creature of
civil law, a like treatment could be given the limited partnership, a product of France,
another civil law society. 554 F.2d at 1265 n.8. The essential distinction which might be made,
however, is that in Russell, the sociedad remained unique to Puerto Rican commercial law,
while the limited partnership in Carlsberg had become part of an American common law
system.
48. 288 U.S. at 480-81. The Russell Court pointed out that the entity status of both the
joint stock company of Chapman and the limited partnership of Great Southern, which
established their capacity to sue on behalf of the membership, was not sufficient to confer
on them the complete jural personality possessed by a corporation. The Court went on to
demonstrate the similarity of the sociedad and a corporation. Thus, a departure from the rule
of Chapman-Great Southern seemed available if one could convince a court that the entity
in a particular case had not only capacity to sue but also operated as if it were a corporation,
lacking only the formality of incorporation.
49. See, e.g., Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948) (in an action
against a joint stock company, the court looked to the entity's capacity to be sued as determi-
native of its citizenship treatment). In a footnote to the case, the court, citing Russell,
concluded that Chapman was superseded. In Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392
(2d Cir. 1964) (unincorporated joint stock association was deemed a citizen for diversity
purposes), Judge Waterman, citing Russell, stated that in the court's opinion, Chapman
should be abandoned in favor of a more flexible rule which utilized a corporate resemblance
test. Ten years later, in Baer v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 503 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1974), Judge
Waterman denied citizenship to an unincorporated reciprocal insurance association, distin-
guishing the insurance association from the joint stock association in Mason, and admitting
that as a result of Bouligny the "precedential value of Mason was, at the least, seriously
undermined." Id. at 396.
50. 382 U.S. at 146.
51. Id. at 152.
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traditional rules of citizenship dealing with unincorporated associa-
tions.52
At first glance, the majority's strict application of the non-
corporate-no entity test developed by the cases appears merito-
rious. 5 On closer analysis, however, it is a simplistic test that is
difficult to defend as to all noncorporate organizations regardless of
their internal structure. The shortcoming of the test is typified by
the limited partnership in Carlsberg, where the limited partners
lacked the capacity to bring a cause of action under the relevant
state law, a uniform limited partnership statute adopted by forty-
nine states. 4 The presence of a uniform statute is a guarantor of
52. Id. The dissent in Carlsberg asserted that the Bouligny Court retreated from the task
of constructing a test for the citizenship of a labor union because of the complexity of the
task. 554 F.2d at 1264. However, the thrust of the Bouligny opinion seemed to be that the
Court will not devise a test for any unincorporated association. Having experienced problems
in ascertaining the citizenship of an apparently simpler business structure, the corporation,
the Court deferred the status of all unincorporated associations to a congressional solution.
382 U.S. at 153. However, that was twelve years ago. Perhaps, given the multitudinous
development of the limited partnership as a business structure and its mandatory conformity
to a uniform statutory pattern, the Court would now find no objection to recognizing its entity
status for diversity purposes.
53. In fact, many jurisdictions use this one-dimensional approach. See, e.g., Jim Walters
Investors v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (real estate investment
trust was treated as an unincorporated association and citizenship of the entity was deemed
to be that of each of its member shareholders, citing Bouligny). In Chase Manhattan Mort-
gage & Realty Trust v. Pendley, 405 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (trust acting through
trustees given status of an unincorporated trust), trustees attempted to amend averments
asserting individual status but were denied the right, with the court holding that the capacity
of the trustees to sue did not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. One year after
Bouligny, the Court did liberalize venue rules concerning unincorporated associations in
Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 485 (1967), holding
that a venue statute, providing that corporations could be sued in any district in which they
were incorporated or licensed to do business, included residences of unincorporated associa-
tions as proper places for litigation. However, the Court's liberal construction of a venue
statute does not foretell diversity jurisdiction being expanded. Venue exists as a matter of
convenience and court discretion for litigants, while the criteria of citizenship has a constitu-
tional foundation.
54. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 83. Unlike the uniform statutory base of Carlsberg, Great
Southern involved a limited partnership formed under Pennsylvania law (177 U.S. at 450) at
a time when few states had authorized the existence of this type of business entity, offering
immunity from suit to limited partners. See Coleman & Weatherbie, Special Problems in
Limited Partnership Planning, 30 S.W. L.J. 887-923 (1976). Chapman involved a joint stock
company, specifically authorized by a New York statute, but not part of a nationally uniform
statutory pattern. 129 U.S. at 677. The uniform code defines the parties to a cause of action,
specifically denying to the limited partners any capacity to sue or be sued by a third party.
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 26; 59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 545 (Purdon Supp. 1977-
1978).
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proper federal jurisdiction because it identifies the proper parties to
the cause of action while eliminating the possibility of forum shop-
ping.
CAPACITY INQUIRY
The dissent maintained that the critical factor in determining the
citizenship of the limited partners was the statutory incapacity of
the limited partners to sue or be sued by third parties. Historically,
the Court has required that all parties who possess the capacity to
sue and who have an interest in the suit before a federal court must
be counted in diversity cases.55 It appears that the Supreme Court,
in determining whose citizenship was to be counted, looked to state
law to determine the real parties in interest, 7 requiring that each
possess capacity." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which be-
came effective in 1938,11 also linked parties in interest to capacity.
Rule 17(a) ° guides the federal court in determining the capacity of
parties suing in a representative role, and rule 17(b)"' is the guide
as to all other parties except infants and incompetents, who were
covered by rule 17(c). Both sections (a) and (b) are based on capac-
ity to sue; neither suggests how to handle a party who lacks capacity
because of the exclusionary effect of a positive command of a state
statute.
55. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Chief Justice Marshall reasoned
that distinct interests were to be represented by "all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be
sued, in the federal courts . . . . [Elach of the persons concerned in that interest must be
competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those courts."
56. In Rice v.Houston, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 67 (1871), the Court, in examining the capacity
of an administrator to sue the debtor of the decedent's estate in federal court, looked both to
the authority of the administrator, as granted by the state court, and to the state's statutes
which imposed active duties on the administrator. See also note 63 infra.
57. The real party in interest for the purposes of an action in the federal courts is the
person with the enforceable right. 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.07 (2d ed. 1977).
58. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
59. The Enabling Act was signed in 1934 and empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe
general rules for the operation of the district courts. The act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1970).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). Rule 17(b) is the traditional association section for procedural
purposes. The rule recognizes that state law is to be determinative of the entity status of the
unincorporated association for suability while the accompanying notes reveal that this entity
capacity exists merely for pleading purposes and does not affect the federal diversity juris-
diction of such associations.
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A reasonable way of solving the dilemma of Carlsberg is to read
17(a) and 17(b) in pari materia. A federal court could count all the
general partners who have capacity and who also assert a represent-
ative status in the limited partnership, following 17(a), and still
adhere to the directives of rule 17(b) and the case law surrounding
that rule by counting all the members of the limited partnership
who possess capacity. After all, precedent does not suggest the
counting of parties who have no capacity to sue or be sued unless
the party suing is purely nominal.2 Furthermore, when the federal
court has asserted diversity jurisdiction, capacity is determined by
looking at state law.63 It seems logical that since the general partner
is the real party in interest, only that class should count. The lim-
ited partner is not a real party in interest; his right to sue is either
derivative64 or representative, 5 but individual in very few instan-
ces.66 Limited partners have the right to intervene where a general
partner refuses to defend the partnership against a collusive suit,67
62. 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 17.04 (2d ed. 1977).
63. For example, capacity is determined by looking at state law to determine which party
has an interest in cases involving wrongful death, suits by executors or administrators, and
state workmen's compensation cases. 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACICE 17.14, at 17-169 to -
171 (2d ed. 1977). "Except where a federal right is involved the substantive law to be looked
to, of course, is the law of the state in which the federal district court is held." Id. 17.07, at
17-73. If the law of the forum makes the interest of the administrator nominal, then the courts
look to the beneficiary for citizenship. Id. 17.04, at 17-30. Federal law determines capacity
in cases which involve federal statutory rights, e.g., Federal Employees' Compensation Act
or the Bankruptcy Act.
64. See N.Y. PARTNEImHiP LAw § 115-a (McKinney 1977). In Alpert v. Haimes, 64 Misc.
2d 608, 315 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1970), the limited partners were compelled to bring a
derivative suit by the New York law and were barred from proceeding individually to assert
the partnership interest. See also Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 128, 125
Cal. Rptr. 59, 66-67 (1975), where the court generally barred limited partners from bringing
a lawsuit on behalf of a limited partnership while permitting them an individual cause of
action against the general partner for breach of fiduciary duty. The courts in New York
judicially created the derivative right of the limited partners, which the legislature then
enacted into statute. See Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E. 2d 876
(1966).
65. See, e.g., Lerman v. Tenney, 425 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1970) (class action and not deriva-
tive suit is proper when the limited partner charges the general partner with a violation of
federal security laws and state anti-fraud laws); Alpert v. Haimes, 64 Misc. 2d 608, 315
N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (representative class suits occur when the limited partner
alleges the general partner breached his common law duty).
66. UNIFORM LIMrrED PArNERSHIP ACT § 10. The limited and general partners can both
inspect and copy partnership books, demand full and formal accounting of partnership funds,
and sue for the dissolution of the partnership. All these rights are intrapartnership, however,
and none give limited parties a cause of action outside the partnership.
67. Linder v. Vogue Invs., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 2d 338, 48 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1966).
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the intervention being a matter of ancillary jurisdiction, where citi-
zenship is not dispositive .8
The court of appeals, however, implicitly rejected this application
of the federal rules of procedure as jurisdictional guidelines, basing
its decision on rule 82 which declares that jurisdiction shall neither
be extended nor limited by the rules of civil procedure."5 But in
bypassing rule 17, the Carlsberg court did, in effect, what it pur-
ported not to do: it expanded the reach of federal common law to
define the perimeters of jurisdiction. Prior to the enactment of the
rules of civil procedure, the court apparently had used state statutes
to define capacity in diversity cases.7" Thus, by eliminating this
frame of reference, the command of rule 82 to maintain the status
quo in jurisdictional determinations despite the rules is violated.
Perhaps the court was unwilling to develop a variant rule to the
traditional treatment of unincorporated associations specifically
adapted to limited partnerships because it conceptualized the rela-
tionship between the limited and general partners as that of princi-
pal and agent."' By looking at the parties who stood to benefit pecu-
niarily, the court must have forgotten the fact that the limited
partners remained only nominal parties despite their apparent ben-
eficial interest.7" It is uncertain whether the court of appeals in
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
69. 554 F.2d at 1261.
70. In Susquehanna & Wyo. Valley R.R. & Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172
(1871), the Court distinguished the real parties in interest from the nominal parties by
examining the intent of the relevant state statute and the rights and powers of the plaintiffs
who were the real prosecutors of the suit. See also notes 56 & 63 supra. In Puerto Rico v.
Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), the Court examined the status of the sociedad, i.e., the
capacity to sue, within the ambit of the territorial statutes of Puerto Rico in determining the
citizenship identity of the parties to the suit.
71. See, e.g., Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1962) (relationship
between general and limited partners is not that of broker and principal or special agent and
principal, but general partner-agent and principal); Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App.
3d at 128, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (the courts recognize no separate identities between general
and limited partners as they do in the relationship between the shareholder and the corpora-
tion). In Donroy, the court considered the nature of the limited partnership comparable to
that of a partnership, and thus regarded it as an association of individuals rather than as a
legal entity. 301 F.2d at 206. The court then stated that
each partner, whether general or limited has an interest as such in the assets and the
profits of the partnership, including the physical plant or offices at which the partner-
ship conducts its business, so that the office or permanent establishment of the part-
nership is in law, the office of each of the partners-whether general or limited.
Id. at 207. Contra, UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNEHISm P AcT § 18 ("A limited partners' interest in
the partnership is personal property").
72. In Carlsberg, the limited partners contributed more than 99% of the capital, net
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Carlsberg was swayed in its decision by a consideration of the dis-
proportionately greater property interests of the limited partner as
compared to the general partners; the district court seemed to have
been .13
If the federal courts deem lack of capacity to sue irrelevant to the
question of citizenship, they arguably have that right.74 However,
there are some compelling reasons why lack of capacity of the lim-
ited partners should be determinative for diversity citizenship pur-
poses. The state's interest in enacting special provisions for the
limited partners is to encourage individuals to invest.75 By denying
a federal forum, the Carlsberg decision will have a negative impact
on the development of these multiparty-multistate business entities
since the parties involved often desire the availability of a federal
forum. The appeal of the limited partnership as an attractive busi-
ness organization could be altered, and the substantive law of forty-
nine forums could be thwarted, if the courts continue to analyze the
diversity jurisdiction of a limited partnership in a vacuum. The
result is a seemingly contradictory tilt for the post-Erie federal
courts.
Moreover, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not previously
adhered to the rigid position it now supports. In Pavlovscak v.
Lewis,7" where a miner brought an action against the trustees of the
profits being allocated in a ratio 95% to limited partners and 5% to general partners. 413
F.Supp. at 882. Also, it is clear that the modem limited partnership was created in reponse
to the peculiarities of the income tax law. The individual limited partner is a direct benefici-
ary of the tax idiosyncrasies which outline a fine line between corporate entities and partner-
ships for its taxing purposes. See Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 745-62 (1977).
73. 413 F. Supp. at 884. The court pointed out that over 1500 limited partners stood to
profit from this case. Thus, it can be inferred that the district court counted all the members
of the limited partnership regardless of class distinction because of each partner's financial
interest in a positive verdict.
74. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions ... between
(1) citizens of different States .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). The federal courts thus have
proprietary rights in the arena of federal jurisdiction and some contemporary courts may seek
to detach their jurisdictional competence from state statutes which define capacity. In Ziady
v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1968) (traditional guardian ad litem situation which involved
nominal parties), the court held that the problem of citizenship (in that case domicile), is
uniquely one of federal cognizance. The court implied that its jurisdictional prerogatives are
within the perimeter of the Erie rationale, as the latter explicitly points federal courts at the
states for substantive law in diversity cases but implicitly retains the residuary to the federal
courts. The residuary could be enormous.
75. UNIFORM LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 1 & Comment.
76. 274 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960). The court allowed
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United Mine Workers' retirement fund, the court made subtle dis-
tinctions in its diversity of citizenship analysis between classes of
individuals in which only one entity was looked to for diversity
purposes while three classes existed. The court, considering the spe-
cial and defined purposes for which the trust involved in the case
was created, looked only to the trustees for citizenship, ignoring
both the beneficiaries and the contributors to the trust. The court,
in coming to this decision, considered the state's common law treat-
ment of the fund as a guide to its own determination of the fund's
status. Analogizing this to Carlsberg, the general partners could
have been considered tantamount to trustees, and limited partners
equivalent to beneficiary-contributors who had no management
control, and who, in addition, lacked capacity by statutory enact-
ment. Arguably the court of appeals could have used 17(b) as a
guide and counted all the general partners in a fashion similar to
Pavlovscak, or alternatively, it could have used 17(a) and counted
the partners who had representative capacity-all the general
partners-as it implicitly did in Pavlovscak. Either approach seems
more logical than the one taken.
CONCLUSION
In a contradictory fashion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
emphasized its support of federalism and its concern that federal
courts not encroach on state issues," but repudiated any reliance on
a specific state statute to define citizenship in a diversity case where
such reliance would seem logical.
Faced with the alternative of carving out an exception for the
treatment of limited partnerships for diversity jurisdiction pur-
jurisdiction to be exercised over a miners' retirement fund, considering it an unincorporated
association, and counted only the trustees of the fund for citizenship purposes, not counting
either the mine owners or the mine workers. The court distinguished Underwood v. Maloney,
256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1958), where a labor union was denied entity status: first, union mem-
bers did not pay into the fund or control it; second, union members had only an expectancy
interest in the funds; and third, trustees were independent of workers and operators, agents
of neither. Bouligny could have been distinguished in Carlsberg as Underwood was distin-
guished in Pavlovscak. Furthermore, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Pavlovscak looked
to Stampolis v. Lewis, 186 Pa. Super. Ct. 285, 142 A.2d 348, allocatur denied (Pa. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959), as Pennsylvania authority for its conclusion that a retirement
fund should be treated as an entity. In Carlsberg, the court could have found similar authori-
zation in the uniform state statute.
77. 554 F.2d at 1257.
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poses, the court instead chose to rely on the case law rule of nonciti-
zenship status for noncorporate associations. The court did not ad-
dress the arguably viable option to sift out parties who should be
counted for citizenship by a pari materia reading of rule 17(a) and
(b). This type of a test for determining the citizenship of an unincor-
porated association where a uniform statute existed would then re-
quire a balancing of past decisions with the real party in interest or
status analysis.
By refusing to consider the uniqueness of the limited partnership
as an entity, the Carlsberg court has perhaps set the stage for some
anomalous results. For example, where the court is faced with a
limited partnership composed of a large class of general partners
and few limited partners, one of whom happens to be a citizen of
the state of the opposing party, it must deny jurisdiction based on
Carlsberg or retreat from the corner in which it has placed itself.
The court painted with a broad stroke where the situation de-
manded a fine line of distinction.
Mary Baloh
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